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Abstract: 
 Between 1899 to 1956 the United Kingdom ruled Sudan through the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium. During this period of colonial rule, British administrators divided 
the country into two distinct regions, North and South Sudan. Through a process called 
the ‘Southern Policy’, South Sudan was administered separately from the more 
economically developed North.  The policy was intended as a protectionist barrier to 
prevent the exploitation of the economically underdeveloped south by the north. 
However, due to Britain’s laissez-faire economic policy in South Sudan, the southern 
regions were excluded from the government-sponsored economic development of the 
north, such as the Gezira Irrigation Scheme. The result of Britain’s colonial policies was 
the hegemonic domination of the North over the South. Furthermore, the incorporation 
of Northern elites into the colonial administration ensured that this unjust and 
inequitable power structure would continue throughout the postcolonial era.  
 The economic, educational, and political benefits rendered upon the North, 
compared to the neglect and expropriation inflicted upon the South led to a vastly 
disproportionate balance of power in the independent Sudanese Government. This 
power disparity was the direct cause of the Sudanese Civil War, fought between 1956 
and 2005.  
 When South Sudan gained full independence in 2011, it entered statehood as 
one of the poorest, least developed nations in the world. The century of neglect under 
the British and of violence and oppression under the North Sudanese left the fledgling 
country with an insecure future. Two years after gaining its independence, South Sudan 
was again thrust back into civil conflict. South Sudan’s history of civil war is a result of 
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the oppression and underdevelopment inflicted by Britain’s colonial administration and 
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Introduction 
On April 15, 2014 a company of armed fighters captured the city of Bentiu, the 
capital of the South Sudanese state of Unity. The citizens of Bentiu may have had hope 
that the rebels, primarily of the Nuer ethnic group, would be liberators. However, their 
optimism was short-lived. As the city fell, rampaging gunmen perpetrated one of the 
deadliest massacres of the 21st century. Directed by commanders on local radio 
stations, rebel troops went door to door committing indiscriminate atrocities. After two 
days of bloodshed, hundreds lay dead. When United Nations observers and 
peacekeepers arrived on the scene, the rebels had vanished, leaving piles of bodies 
and shattered lives in their wake. One UN observer reported “A strong stench of 
decomposing remains filled the air, while vultures and dogs ate off limbs, scalps and 
abdomen flesh.”1   The mutilated corpses conjure images of Nanking in 1938 or 
Rwanda in 1994. An official White House statement read, “Accounts of the attacks 
shock the conscience. It’s an abomination.”2  Gut-wrenching experiences have become 
a facet of daily life in the war-ravaged nation of South Sudan. 
The Bentiu massacre was not an isolated event, nor was it the first escalation of 
violence in South Sudan by belligerents in the nation’s five-year long civil war. South 
Sudan, the world’s youngest country, has been embroiled in civil conflict for the entirety 
of its independent history. The Council on Foreign Relations estimates that 50,000 
people have been killed since 2013, with over four million being forced to flee their 
                                                     
1 Fred Barbash, "An ‘Abomination’: Slaughter in The Mosques and Churches of Bentiu, South Sudan", Washington 
Post, 2014, accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/04/23/an-
abomination-slaughter-in-the-mosques-and-churches-of-bentiu-south-sudan/?utm_term=.e99810971b93. 
2 Barbash, “Abomination.”  
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homes, and an additional five million are at risk of starvation.3  The mounting atrocities 
committed by all sides in this complex conflict have garnered attention from media and 
academics. Since 2013, politicians and experts in foreign relations and international 
development have been trying to unravel this labyrinthine conflict. Many simplistically 
attribute the violence to ethnic tension or political inexperience. However, as I argue in 
this paper, South Sudan’s history of internal strife did not begin in 2011 when it gained 
independence from the North, nor did it begin in 1956, when the united Sudan gained 
impendence from Great Britain. The South Sudanese Civil War is the result of the 
neglect, underdevelopment, and mismanagement perpetrated by Britain’s colonial 
administration and perpetuated by the Northern-dominated Sudanese government 
during the united era (1956-2011). This conflict must be reframed from a result of ethnic 
differences and political inexperience in a young country, to the postcolonial product of 
unstable political systems, pervasive underdevelopment and extreme competition for 
resources. 
Literature Review: 
South Sudan is not unique in its postcolonial history. The Sudanese postcolonial 
experience is mirrored in former colonial holdings throughout the Global South. The 
practice of artificially elevating specific sects of society through indirect rule creates 
unstable power dynamics that often lead the country into civil conflict. This phenomenon 
was seen in the Congo and Rwanda under Belgian rule, and French Mali and Chad. 
Regarding this phenomenon, Paul Collier wrote, societies that have one group that is 
large enough to form a majority of the population, but where other groups are still 
                                                     
3 "Global Conflict Tracker", Cfr.Org, last modified 2018, accessed February 14, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/civil-war-in-south-sudan. 
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significant— what we call “ethnic dominance”—are indeed more at risk.”4 The colonial 
model employed in these holdings focused on resource extraction, not settlement. In an 
attempt to combat the extensive financial and human demands of traditional 
colonialism, colonizers began shifting to indirect rule. This colonial framework relies on 
the subversion of existing power structures, rather than the creation of new ones. 
Indirect rule artificially sustains a hierarchy, often times religious or ethnic, and allows 
unstable power structures to survive. Furthermore, it positions those at the top of the 
hierarchy to succeed the colonial government in the postcolonial era. These dynamics 
are very much in play in postcolonial Sudan.  
There is a substantial volume of literature regarding the Sudanese Civil War, and 
the genocide in Darfur, beginning in 2003, drew the attention of media outlets across 
the world. As one of the world’s deadliest conflict zones, the contemporary South 
Sudanese Civil War receives considerable media and scholarly attention. Clemence 
Pinaud theorizes that the development of wartime power structures stemming from the 
fifty-year civil war created deep divisions within South Sudanese society, leading to the 
current civil war. She wrote, “predation by armed groups during the second civil war 
(1983–2005) initiated a process of dominant class formation, and demonstrates how, 
through various strategies of resource capture and kinship networks, commanders from 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other factions formed a new 
aristocracy.”5 Pinaud’s analysis hinges upon the idea that divisions among ethnic 
                                                     
4 Paul Collier, Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 28. 
5 Clemence Pinaud, "South Sudan: Civil War, Predation and the Making of o Military Aristocracy", African Affairs 
113, no. 451 (2014): 192-211, accessed March 2, 2018, 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.seattleu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=8f175f4e-2c13-4dbf-
9901-fafe912d9676%40sessionmgr102. 
 Lin 6 
groups led to the fragmentation of the SPLA, and as the population became increasing 
militarized, the prospect of civil conflict became inevitable. Brosché and Höglund take a 
similar contemporary approach to their conflict analysis. They conclude that the South 
Sudanese Civil War stems from weak constitutional institutions within the transitionary 
government, which led to inherent political instability in the fledgling country. This 
instability manifested itself in the political split between President Salva Kiir and Vice-
President Riek Machar.6 The conclusions reached by Pinaud, Brosché, and Höglund, 
while cogent in their analysis, fail to consider the historical factors that contributed to the 
instability and civil war throughout Sudan’s history, namely, the legacy of 
underdevelopment and oppression by Britain’s colonial administration and the 
independent Sudanese government. There have been relatively few publications linking 
the current events in South Sudan to the colonial era. This paper will connect the 
colonial era (1889 -1956) with the united Sudanese era (1956-2011) to the 
contemporary civil conflict (2013-).  
 
Pre-Colonial History and Geography 
On the eve of Britain’s formal colonization of Sudan in 1899, the country was far 
from homogenous, politically or ethnically. The geographic area of Sudan is diverse as it 
is vast, formerly comprising the largest country in Africa and home to hundreds of 
distinct ethnic groups.7  The most significant fissure is along the North-South axis, which 
                                                     
6 Johan Brosché and Kristine Höglund, "Crisis of Governance in South Sudan: Electoral Politics And Violence In The 
World's Newest Nation", The Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 01 (2016): 67-90, accessed March 11, 2018, 
https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.seattleu.edu/docview/1763352604/abstract/62B141EDD0BE4643PQ/1?accountid=28598. 
7 Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4. 
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divides the country not only geographically, but politically, religiously, and ethnically. 
Northern Sudanese derive their cultural identity from their religion, with an 
overwhelming majority adhering to Sunni Islam. Conversely, South Sudan is far more 
diverse from the North, both religiously and ethnically. However, South Sudan has 
traditionally been dominated by the two largest ethnic groups, the Nuer and the Dinka.  
Sudan is as diverse geographically as it is culturally. The northern regions of 
Sudan suffer from a dearth of potable water due to its extremely hot and arid climate, as 
well as encroaching desertification. In contrast to the North, Southern Sudan 
experiences a tropical, equatorial climate, conducive to agriculture, which was the 
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Figure 1: Religion and Language Breakdown of Sudan8 
 
In 1821, the Northern regions of Sudan fell under the personal rule of 
Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt. Collins theorizes that a primary 
motivation for Ali’s invasion of Sudan was the acquisition of slaves for his private army.9  
Islamic law, or Sharia law, prohibits the capture of Muslims for the purpose of 
enslavement, leaving Ali with one logical source for slaves, the predominantly Christian 
and Animist South Sudan. At the height of this slave trade in 1860, an estimated 15,000 
slaves were sent North every year.10  The North-South slave trade implemented by the 
Turko-Egyptian regime sowed the seeds of hegemony and Northern dominance that 
would persist for two centuries. 
In 1881, a boat-builder named Muhammad Ahmed ibn Abdallah claimed to have 
received visions from the Prophet Muhammad, who declared him the Mahdi.11 Abdallah 
amassed thousands of followers, primarily Orthodox Muslims throughout Northern and 
Central Sudan, by promoting his movement as a return to Islamic fundamentalism. In 
the same year, Abdallah declared a jihad, or holy war, against the Turko-Egyptian 
regime, who he claimed were heretics and infidels. By 1885, Abdallah’s forces captured 
Khartoum, formally establishing the Mahdist Regime.  
                                                     
8 Sergio Pecanha, "The Tough Task of Defining Sudan’s North-South Border - Map - Nytimes.Com", Nytimes.Com, 
last modified 2018, accessed March 1, 2018, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/16/world/africa/sudan-graphic.html. 
9 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 12. 
10 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 16. 
11 Mahdi translates to ‘guided one’ or ‘messiah’. In Sunni Islam the Mahdi is a companion of Isa (Jesus) and will 
bring justice to the world. 
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In 1898, the Mahdist forces were decisively defeated at the Battle of Omdurman 
by an Anglo-Egyptian army. Mahdist casualties numbered 26,000, compared to 430 for 
the Anglo-Egyptian side. Regarding the battle, a young Winston Churchill wrote, “it is 
the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians. Within the 
space of five hours the strongest and best-armed savage army yet arrayed against a 
modern European Power had been destroyed and dispersed, with hardly any 
difficulty.”12  This racist and condescending summation was emblematic of senior British 
officials the colonial era and would manifest itself during Britain’s administration of 
Sudan. In 1899, the British Empire, in a joint venture with Egypt, established the Anglo-
Egyptian condominium of Sudan, formalizing their control of the country. 
Patterns of Colonization 
Britain’s interest in Sudan must be contextualized within the larger ‘Scramble for 
Africa’ movement in the latter half of the 19th century. For the wealthy and industrialized 
European powers, Africa offered secondary markets for manufactured goods and a 
seemingly endless source of raw materials, principally rubber, cotton, ivory, and gold. At 
the Berlin Conference of 1884, Britain’s claim to Sudan was formalized among 
European powers. It should be noted that no African representatives participated in or 
were invited to this conference. 
Similar to Britain’s colonial project in India, the colonial administration in Sudan 
took the form of indirect rule. Traditionally, indirect rule refers to the use of indigenous 
leaders govern under the supervision of colonial administrators. However, Collin 
Newbury would have us revise this definition to include a clientelist model that imposes 
                                                     
12 Winston S. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of The Sudan (New York, NY: Carroll and Graf 
Publishers, 2000), 300. 
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an ethnic hierarchy. Newbury also states that there is a notion of modus vivendi, or 
complicity by those at the top of the hierarchy.13  In Sudan, this theory is supported by 
the British elevation of Northern Muslim elites into the colonial administration. In return 
for this patronage, client classes (Northern, Arab, Muslim, elites) lent legitimacy and a 
degree of stability to the colonial administration.  
Colonial Policy in Practice 
Through a process called the ‘Southern Policy’, South Sudan was administered 
separately from the more economically developed north. The Southern Policy 
delineated race by religion. The stated aim of the Southern Policy was “keep the 
Southern Sudan as free as possible of Mohammedan influence."14  The British 
administration devoted significantly more resources to development in the North than in 
the South, particularly in the fields of education and industry. This unequal distribution of 
resources and capital contributed to the Northern domination over the South in the 
independent era and established a hegemony that pervaded Sudanese political and 
economic society until 2011, when the South gained independence. The result was the 
severe underdevelopment of South Sudan.   
British mismanagement of Sudan stemmed from a disastrous failure in long-term 
planning. Officials within the British administration had not intended for the North and 
South to become a single state in the independent era. Instead, many within the 
Sudanese colonial administration intended for South Sudan to gain official emancipation 
                                                     
13 Colin Walter Newbury, "Patrons, Clients, And Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies In Asia And 
Africa", Journal of World History 11, no. 2 (2000): 227-263, accessed March 9, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078850. 
14 M. Abdel Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in The Southern Sudan 1899–1947", Middle Eastern 
Studies 2, no. 3 (1966): 227-249, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282161, 230. 
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from the North and join British East Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Harold MacMichael, a 
senior British civil secretary announced that “the administration of the South was to be 
developed along ‘African’, rather than ‘Arab’ lines, and that the future of southern Sudan 
might ultimately lie with the countries of British East Africa, rather than with the Middle 
East.15 An official memorandum to the Milner Mission stated, “The possibility of the 
Southern (black) portion of the Sudan being eventually cut off from the Northern (Arab) 
area and linked up with some Central African system is borne in mind.”16  Under this 
system, Southern regional governors were not invited to attend the annual conferences 
of governors in Khartoum, and were instead encouraged to collaborate with British 
administrators in Uganda and Kenya.  
The Southern Policy manifested itself in the form of the Closed District Order and 
the Permits to Trade Order. Traders and travelers required special permits from the 
British government to cross regional borders in the South. As a result, the southern 
regions remained largely pastoral while the North experience economic advancements, 
particularly in the petroleum industry. Wealth and industry was contained in the northern 
regions as a result of these British policies. 
British Education Policy  
In 1902, Britain founded Gordon College in Khartoum.17 Sharkey claims that 
British administrators had hoped Gordon College would become the “Eton of the Sudan” 
or the “Winchester by the Nile”, plainly, a school for well-born young men to receive the 
necessary training to enter into the British colonial administration. She writes, “Above 
                                                     
15 Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 
2004), 11. 
16 Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in The Southern Sudan." 
17 In 1956, Gordon College was renamed as the University of Khartoum. Today it is the largest university in Sudan.  
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all, they enrolled students from Arabic-speaking, Muslim families that claimed Arab 
genealogies and hailed from the riverain North.”18  Furthermore, Southern students 
were prohibited from traveling North in pursuit of education as a result of the 
aforementioned Closed District Order. Graduates of Gordon college would form the core 
of Sudanese political society, both during the British colonial administration and during 
the early years of the independent era. Sharkey details the effect that Britain’s favoring 
of the already elevated social classes had on Sudanese society, writing, “Educated 
Northerners imagined a nation that took its territorial shape from the colony but its 
cultural shape from themselves. In writings and speeches, they affirmed Arabic and 
Islam as the pillars of the nation.”  Ironically, though Northern Sudanese expressed their 
desire to shape the independent Sudan in their own image, free from colonial influence, 
when independence came, they maintained the British system of Northern hegemony 
over the South. Sharkey also addresses the structural inequality instituted by the British. 
“Rather than reshuffling this social hierarchy [Northern hegemony], British authorities 
reinforced it by setting policies for school enrollment according to gender, region of 
origin, social status and religion, Admissions policies for Gordon College for example, 
privileged those who were male, Muslim, Arabic-speaking, ‘Arab’, and of high status.” 
This method of administration is known as indirect rule i.e. manipulating local institutions 
to maintain control and influence. This system of favoring Northern Muslim students 
over Southerners created a system that excluded Southerners from the colonial 
administration and from the Sudanese government once the nation gained 
independence in 1956. 
                                                     
18 Heather J. Sharkey, Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 7-8. 
 Lin 13 
British education policy in the South was far more informal than in the North. By 
its own admission, the British colonial administration made few attempts at organizing 
state-sponsored educational institutions in the South, such as the North’s prestigious 
Gordon College. The administration delegated responsibility for education development 
in South to Christian missionary groups, whose primary goal was proselytization.  
Regarding the education disparity between the North and South, the British Governor-
General of Sudan in 1921 wrote, "As regards education, in the Northern Sudan, of 
course, the Government schools have always been the main recruiting grounds for 
clerical and junior technical staff. In the [South] it has not been possible to do very 
much.”19  This refusal or inability to devote resources to education programs in the 
South set the region on the path to failure. When Sudan gained independence, the 
overwhelming majority of government officials were supplied from the North, allowing 
the government to continue its neglectful and abusive policies towards the South.  
State Economic Policy in British Sudan 
During its administration, Britain heavily invested in economic development 
schemes in Northern Sudan. The administration’s economic policy in the South during 
the same period can best be described as laissez-faire, or non-interventionist. This 
policy is exemplified by the Gezira Irrigation Scheme. A massive capital investment by 
the British, the Gezira scheme consisted of 2,700 miles of irrigation ditches and canals 
in Northern Sudan. Douglas claims that the scheme “enabled the Sudan to enter the 
international cotton trade. No similar schemes were attempted in the South until after 
                                                     
19 H. W. Jackson, Report on The Finances, Administration and Condition of The Soudan in 1921 (Khartoum: 
Governor-General of the Soudan, 1921). 
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the war, and then very hurriedly and with unsatisfactory results.”20  That no mass-
cultivation projects were attempted in the South despite the region’s suitable climate is 
telling of Britain’s overall economic objectives in Sudan. The lack of capital investment 
in the South, combined with the Closed Districts and Permit to Trade orders, ensured 
that the southern regions of Sudan would enter independence at a severe economic 
disadvantage to the North. 
British Social and Economic Policy 
Britain’s method of rule also had the effect of creating horizontal inequalities and 
fostering historical grievances among ethnic groups that would later play a significant 
role in the current civil conflict in South Sudan. Cosgrove states that horizontal 
inequality isn’t just about income inequality between groups, but also inequality across 
capabilities – political participation, access to health, education and other public 
services, and cultural entitlements – as well.21 Indirect rule exacerbates these dynamics 
by artificially elevating certain ethnic groups. These strucutes are particularly prevalent 
within the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. South Sudan’s geography and the pastoral 
nature of its population meant that the British ‘pacification’ of the South was slow and 
uneven. In an effort to hasten their efforts and bolster their tax revenue, Britain 
employed soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group as an irregular militia. Thomas writes, 
“Dinka individuals who had formerly allied themselves to slavers were used in violent 
campaigns to pacify and tax Nuer communities.”22 This system created deep fractures 
within South Sudan’s already diverse ethnic communities. The hostility between Dinka 
                                                     
20 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, 17. 
21 Serena Cosgrove, "Conflict and Poverty", in Understanding Global Poverty: Causes, Capabilities, And Human 
Development, 1st ed. (London: Routledge Press, 2017) 176. 
22 Edward Thomas, South Sudan: A Slow Liberation (London: Zed, 2015) 74. 
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and Nuer groups is a dominant facet of the current civil war in South Sudan. The British 
colonial policy in Sudan developed unsustainable power structures between the North 
and the South, and between ethnic groups in the South. The result of this 
mismanagement, underdevelopment, and neglect was the Northern dominance and 
hegemony within the independent Sudanese government.  
It was not until the Juba Conference of 1947 that the decision was made to unite 
North and South Sudan into a single nation. Regarding this abrupt change in policy, 
Governor-General Sir Hubert Huddleston wrote: 
The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to 
act upon the facts that the peoples of the Sudan are distinctively African 
and Negroid, but the geography and economics combine (so far as can be 
seen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future 
development to the Middle Eastern and Arabicized Northern Sudan; and 
therefore sot ensure that they should by educational and economic 
development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as 
socially and economically the equals of their partners in the Sudan of the 
future.23 
 
Ironically, the exploitation of the less developed South by the more developed North 
was a point of concern for British administrators; however, unification was deemed to be 
the most equitable solution. One regional governor believed that unification would be 
the least problematic future for the country, writing: 
The best future we [the British] can give the South is federation with the 
North on equal footing and that we should not cloud the issue now by 
vague promises of self-determination in the South which would antagonise 
Northern opinion and raise false hopes in the South. We took over the 
trusteeship of one united Sudan and as one united Sudan we should hand 
back the trusteeship to a Government of Northern and Southern 
Sudanese.24 
 
                                                     
23 Mohamed Omar Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background in Conflict (London: Praeger, 1968), 62-63. 
24 Omar Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background in Conflict, 64. 
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British administrators showed little foresight in their belief that a nominal state would 
negate the half-century of hegemony that the North enjoyed under colonial rule. 
Furthermore, to describe colonialism as ‘trusteeship’ is indicative of the arrogant, 
Kiplingesque attitude with which Britain approached their colonial project. Mohamed 
Abdel Rahim describes the effect of Britain’s failure, “Southern Policy was by far the 
greatest failure of that Administration and there can be no doubt that by implementing it 
the Condominium regime has landed the independent Sudan with its most intractable 
problem and the present generation of Sudanese people, with the greatest challenge in 
their post-independence history.”25 Britain’s long-term planning failures led to South 
Sudan being ill-prepared to join the independent nation of Sudan. The result of this 
failure was the primacy of the North Sudanese government, which allowed the failed 
British policies regarding South Sudan to remain in place. 
Northern Domination in Independent Sudan 
On January 1st, 1956 Sudan gained its independence from Britain. The 
Sudanese government, based in the Northern city of Khartoum, was dominated by elite, 
Northern, Arab, Muslim men. The result was the general continuation of Britain’s 
negligent policy regarding the country’s Southern regions. Regarding the power 
dynamics in independent Sudan, Rahim wrote, “The southern Sudanese lagged far 
behind many of the northern Sudanese in education, economic development, and 
involvement in the government and administration of the country. In consequence, they 
lacked any real or potential voice in the direction of the country’s affairs.”26 This 
precarious situation is a direct result of the British colonial polices. In London, Sudanese 
                                                     
25 Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in The Southern Sudan.” 
26 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 16. 
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independence may have appeared to be a successful devolutionary transfer of power to 
native populations. However, in South Sudan, independence was preempted by an 
army mutiny that would place the new nation on the path to civil war. The Sudanese 
Civil War would cause the deaths of three million people between 1955 to 2005.27 
A leading cause of the first outbreak of civil war was Southern fears of Northern 
exploitation in the united era. Johnson wrote, “The rapid increase of Northerners in the 
South as administrators, senior officers in the army and police, teachers in government 
schools. And as merchants, increased Southern fears of Northern domination and 
colonization.”28  South Sudanese leaders advocated for a federalist government model, 
which was explicitly rejected by the Northern government officials who sought to 
centralize political power in Khartoum and enforce Islamic religious and cultural values 
in the South. The 1955 Mutiny was desultory in its aims and had limited success. 
However, in retaliation for the mutiny, Northern soldiers burned villages, arrested 
Southern leaders, and tortured civilians.29 The result was the further mobilization of 
South Sudanese civilians and the birth of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SSLM), the military and political force of South Sudan the initial stage of the civil war. 
It would be a mistake to assume that mutual persecution by the Northern 
government fostered unity among the disparate ethnic groups in the South. The nature 
of the war prevented large-scale cooperation between bands of Southern fighters. 
Johnson characterizes the Southerners as divided and isolated. He writes, “By modern 
standards, the first years of the war were very modestly conducted. The guerrillas were 
                                                     
27 In 1972 the Addis Ababa Agreement led to an 11-year ceasefire. However, due to the informal and multi-
factional nature of the war, raiding and border clashes would occur until war was again declared in 1983.  
28 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, 27. 
29 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 31. 
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knit together very loosely and had no external military support, arming themselves 
mainly by theft from police outposts, the occasional ambush of army patrols, or through 
the defection of Southern police or soldiers.”30 Rather than direct confrontation, much of 
the conflict took the form of raiding of civilian population centers. As many as 500,000 
people were killed in the initial phase of the civil war, many of whom were non-
combatants.  
The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 brought a temporary halt to violence and 
eleven years of relative peace to Sudan, despite ongoing engagements by guerilla and 
irregular military forces.  The agreement provided for limited autonomy in the South, 
particularly in cultural and religious matters. A tentative coexistence lasted until 1978, 
with the discovery of oil in South Sudan. After five years of increasing encroachments 
by the Northern government into the oil-rich regions of South Sudan, President Gaafar 
Nimeiry declared Shari’a in the South, dissolved the Southern Sudan Autonomous 
Region, and abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983.   
In July of 1983, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) published a manifesto detailing the reasons 
for their revolution. Regarding this manifesto, Johnson states, “Underdevelopment was 
identified as characterizing most of Sudan outside of the Central Region, the site of 
most colonial and postcolonial investment. This pattern of unequal development 
continued after independence because the majority of post-independence governments, 
it was claimed, had been in the hands of people from the most developed areas.”31  The 
factors the led to the renewed outbreak of civil war (underdevelopment, competition for 
                                                     
30 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 31. 
31 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 32. 
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resources, and Northern hegemony), are directly attributable to the political and 
economic systems developed by the British during their colonial rule. The second 
outbreak of civil war in 1983 is characterized by its high civilian death toll, human rights 
violations, and war crimes. It is estimated that as many as 2 million people died in the 
conflict, many being non-combatants.  
 
32 
Similarly, to the first instance of civil war, Southern forces in 1983 became fragmented 
as competing factions vied for leadership within the movement. In 1991, Riek Machar, 
the future vice-president and rebel leader, and other Nuer leaders split from the official 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This ethnic factionalism set the stage 
for the later fragmenting of South Sudan’s post-independence government.  
Effects of Civil War on Independent South Sudan 
                                                     
32 "Sudan: 1985 – 2005 | Mass Atrocity Endings", Tufts.Edu, last modified 2018, accessed March 1, 2018, 
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/. 
Figure 2: War-related deaths in Sudan 1983-2005.30 
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The Second Sudanese Civil War consumed nearly two million lives in addition to 
untold human and physical capital.33  The decades of strife left 51 percent of children 
without any formal education. Furthermore, over 16,000 children were used as child 
soldiers. The staggering loss of human, physical, and financial capital was the legacy of 
the Sudanese Civil War. South Sudan entered independence as one of the poorest, 
least developed countries in the world. It consistently ranks at or near the bottom of 
every development index (see Table 1). This pervasive poverty has directly contributed 
to South Sudan’s current civil conflict. As a result, competition for resources led to 
raiding and increased ethnic violence. Serena Cosgrove and Ben Curtis claim, “reiflict 
occurs.”34  South Sudan exemplifies this relationship between economic growth, 
societal stability and conflict. Paul Collier wrote, “low income, slow growth, and primary 
commodity dependence make a country prone to civil war.”35  A century of oppressive 
colonial and Northern policies left South Sudan primed for yet another civil war. 
                                                     
33 Lauren Blanchard, Conflict in South Sudan And the Challenges Ahead (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, 2016). 
34 Serena Cosgrove, "Conflict and Poverty", 180. 
35 Paul Collier, Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 22. 
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Table 1: Human Development Index Rankings of Selected Countries36 
 
In a predictable, vicious cycle of violence, the resulting poverty was a significant 
factor in the outbreak of violence in 2013. The immediate cause of the South Sudanese 
Civil War was a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice-
President, Riek Machar. However, the strife was exacerbated by ethnic tension 
compounded by competition for resources.   Despite South Sudan’s abundant natural 
resources (75% of Sudan’s Oil Fields are in the South), economic opportunity remains 
scarce due to a lack of education and infrastructure.  As a result, competition for 
resources led to raiding and increased ethnic violence. In an attempt at a transitional 
government, the two most powerful men in the cabinet came from the two largest ethnic 
tribes, the Dinka and the Neur. When the two men split, they were supported by their 
respective ethic groups. President Kiir accused Vice President Machar and his Neur 
allies of attempting a coup d’état. Kiir and other Dinka leaders retaliated. The political 
                                                     
36 "2016 Human Development Reports", Hdr.Undp.Org, last modified 2016, accessed March 15, 2018, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. 
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strife was the match that ignited the kindling of poverty, economic desperation, and 
postcolonial devastation.  
Conclusion and Ramifications 
South Sudan is not unique in its postcolonial history. The Sudanese postcolonial 
experience is mirrored in former colonial holdings throughout the Global South. The 
practice of artificially elevating specific sects of society through indirect rule creates 
unstable power dynamics that often lead the country into civil conflict. This phenomenon 
was seen other countries that have experienced postcolonial civil conflict; Congo and 
Rwanda under Belgian rule, and French Mali and Chad. The colonial model employed 
in these holdings focused on resource extraction, not settlement. In an attempt to 
combat the extensive financial and human demands of traditional colonialism, 
colonizers began shifting to indirect rule. This colonial framework relies on the 
subversion of existing power structures, rather than the creation of new ones. Indirect 
rule artificially sustains a hierarchy, often times religious or ethnic, and allows unstable 
power structures to survive. Furthermore, it positions those at the top of the hierarchy to 
succeed the colonial government in the postcolonial era. These dynamics were very 
much in play in postcolonial Sudan.  
Britain’s colonial policy in Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium has 
directly contributed to the current South Sudanese Civil War. Britain’s colonial 
administration favored the economic, political, and human investment of the North, while 
largely neglecting the South. In doing so, North Sudan developed at an 
incommensurate rate compared to the South. This disparity allowed the North to 
implement a hegemonic regime in the postcolonial era. The Northern-dominated 
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Sudanese government effectively continued the oppressive policies in regard to South 
Sudan, leading to a half-century of civil war.  As a result of decades of violence, 
underdevelopment, and oppression, South Sudan entered nationhood primed for civil 
conflict.  
Attempts by the United Nations and the African Union to negotiate an end to the 
conflict have been fruitless. A 2014 peace agreement, which aimed to deescalate the 
conflict and allow civilians to return to their homes, was broken by both sides less than 
24-hours after its signing.37  In April 2015, Riek Machar was again sworn in as vice-
president as part of a second comprehensive peace agreement. However, less than two 
months later, he fled the capital in the wake violent clashes, sparking the renewal of 
open conflict.38  These peace agreements have attempted to address grievances since 
war broke out in 2013, without addressing the historical roots and context of the conflict. 
Any attempt at long-term stability in South Sudan must derive from bottom-up 
approaches to state-building. A pro forma return to the pre-war status quo will only 
result in the continued outbreak of violence. Meaningful and long-term peace must stem 
from a restorative justice approach to state building. In lieu of strong institutions, it is 
critical that South Sudan’s government be truly representative, with voices from all 
ethnic groups and social divisions incorporated.  
 
                                                     
37 BBC, "South Sudan Ceasefire Violated, Rebels and Government Say", 2018, accessed March 14, 2018, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27362508. 
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